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Abstract 
The debate surrounding the role of life insurance, the necessity of risk rating, and 
the notion of “acceptable discrimination” has raised questions about the larger social role of 
insurance. Recent developments in the field of genetics, allowing insurers to make use of 
genetic testing technology as a new underwriting tool, have reinvigorated this debate.   
This article presents a comparative study of positions taken in countries on issues in 
genetics and life insurance. We will analyze the 43 selected countries and comment on their 
potential for ensuring a more equitable access for life insurance applicants.  
 
Introduction 
Life insurance is a private contract between the policyholder and the insurer. It is 
designed to provide financial protection to beneficiaries, in the event of the death of the 
insured. To calculate the amount of the premium, insurers use information such as : age, 
sex, health status and lifestyle factors as well as some information on the applicant’s 
familial health history. The insured will then be assigned to a group comprised of people 
with similar risk factors. By its very nature then, the process of underwriting discriminates 
between individuals on the basis of individual and familial characteristics.i
This “discriminatory” component of the insurance contract is at the center of the 
dilemma.  Insurers currently have the possibility of using genetic information for insurance 
underwriting. While insurers invoke the “mutuality” principle underlying the private life 
insurance contract as well as the risks of “antiselection”ii to justify their access to genetic 
information,iii patients’ groups and human rights activists invoke the risk of discrimination 
and the social role of life insurance.iv The familial and sensitive nature of genetic 
information also serves to exacerbate the debate. 
Only a limited number of predictive genetic tests are sufficiently reliable  to be of 
real use to the insurers.v  Yet, a large number of insurers feel that it is necessary to have 
access to all health information (including genetic information) pertaining to insurance 
applicants or to other people whose lives are to be insured. This would include genetic 
information that has become available in both the clinical setting and in the context of 
genetic research. The demand for access to genetic information is particularly worrisome 
for participants in genetic research. This may very well have a negative impact on genetic 
and genomic research, and result in preventing a given population from benefiting from 
advances.vi  
Many industrialized countries have attempted to ensure the equitable integration of 
genetics in the underwriting process. Others go so far as to use legislation to prohibit by 
access insurers to genetic information. Having conducted an international comparative 
study of the positions of 43 countries,vii we distinguish the emergence of seven positions: 
human rights, therapeutic limit, legislative prohibition, quality control system, moratorium, 
proportional approach, and, the status quo. 
The present article will give a short description of these various positions as well as 
an evaluation of their potential. 
 
Human Rights 
In its 1997 Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 
UNESCO proclaims that:  
“No one shall be subjected to discrimination based on genetic characteristics 
that is intended to infringe or has the effect of infringing human rights, fundamental 
freedoms and human dignity.”viii  
This approach, which aims to prohibit discrimination based on the genetic characteristics of 
the individual, is also found in several international guidelinesix. Altough guidelines are not 
legally binding instruments, in time they have considerable influence on policymakers 
creating pressure on national governments to adapt their legislative or regulatory regimes, 
where needed. The Universal Declaration  on the Human Genome and Human Rights, for 
example, serves as a pivotal instrument for policymaking on genetics and has inspired 
several laws and professional normsx.  
In Europe, according to the Convention on Humans Rights and Biomedicine : “Any 
form of discrimination against a person on grounds of his or her genetic heritage is 
prohibitedxi.” Unlike the Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, the 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine is a legally binding instrument in the 
European countries that have ratified it. Ratification procedures differ in each country, but 
normally involve parliamentary approval. Prior to ratification, each state has to bring its 
laws into line with the Convention. This may require a change or not, or, a new law. Such 
legislation must include legal sanctions and require compensation for individuals who have 
suffered undue harm following medical treatment or researchxii. 
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Some countries seem relucant to introduce specific protection against genetic 
discrimination in human rights legislation. One reason may be that they see no need for 
such a genetic-specific approach; or, they are concerned about the consequences of adding 
another ground of discrimination to existing legal, often constitutional documents. It should 
be noted, however, that a prohibition against genetic discrimination does not necessarily 
mean that all forms of differential treatment based on genetic information become 
impossible. As is the case when other “grounds of discrimination” are mentioned in human 
rights document, further interpretation is needed. The UNESCO Declaration, for example, 
captures it well. The aim of anti-discrimination provisions is to prohibit discrimination that 
impacts on human rights, fundamental freedoms and human dignity. 
Others have expressed concern that distinguishing genetic information from other 
grounds of disability in human rights legislation (or elsewhere) could reinforce genetic 
determinism: the belief that carrying a specific genetic mutation has a much more 
determinant and inevitable impact on people’s health, well-being and potentially even 
behaviour, than other health factors. This could contribute to stigmatization and 
discrimination, and thus have the contrary effect.  
The tendency to single out genetics for special protection has been referred to as 
‘genetic exceptionalism.’xiii This concern about ‘genetic exceptionalism’ is particularly 
poignant in the United States, where most states have introduced some protection against 
genetic discrimination in the context of health insurance. It has been argued that this 
focused protection against genetic discrimination is unfair since so many people remain 
excluded from health insurance on other grounds. Although the consequences are less 
severe when it comes to life insurance, it can also be argued that prohibiting the use of 
genetics in insurance underwriting while allowing similar non-genetic risk factors to be 
used is unfair. xiv
Some have argued also that the term ‘discrimination’ in the context of insurance can 
cause confusion and that the legislator should specify if she wishes to prohibit all types of 
genetic discrimination, including actuarial or rational discrimination, or simply irrational 
discrimination.xv
 Another approach to ensure protection against genetic discrimination, while 
avoiding genetic exceptionalism, is to adapt existing human rights codes so that they clearly 
include genetic susceptibility as one among many other prohibited grounds of 
discrimination. The Ontario Law Reform Commission recommended, for example, that the 
Ontario Human Rights Commission should issue an interpretive rule that states that genetic 
conditions are covered under the existing human rights protections.xvi And it recommended 
that the existing definition of “handicap” should be changed to include the following: 
“‘because of handicap’ means for the reason that the person has or has had, or is believed to 
have or have had, or for the reason that it is believed that the person will have a 
disability.”xvii A recent report prepared for the Ontario Advisory Committee on Genetics 
reiterates this recommendation.xviii  Being regarded or perceived as having a “genetic” 
disability would thus be prohibited. 
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The advantage of this approach is that it indicates that genetic susceptibility or 
predisposition is not necessarily different from other forms of discrimination based on the 
perception of the power of predictive health information while it also affirms the need to 
protect people against inappropriate use of health information by third parties. 
 
Therapeutic Model 
This model, especially popular in European countries, is used in the Convention on 
Humans Rights and Biomedicine of the Council of Europe.  According to the Convention 
(Art. 12) (S.12): 
“Tests which are predictive of genetic diseases or which serve either to identify the 
subject as a carrier of a gene responsible for a disease or to detect a genetic 
predisposition or susceptibility to a disease may be performed only for health purposes 
or for scientific research linked to health purposes, and subject to appropriate genetic 
counselling..” 
This Convention, effective since 2000, has been ratified by 17 members of the Council of 
Europe including a strong proportion of Eastern-European countries.xix The major problem 
with the therapeutic model is that it does not protect information on a person who has 
already undergone a genetic test that is recorded in the medical file.xx  This explains why 
the Convention on Humans Rights and Biomedicine uses the therapeutic model in 
conjunction with the human rights approach. It prohibits discrimination against a person 
based on his or her “genetic inheritance” and at the same time limits the uses of predictive 
genetic tests to health or research purposes exclusively. However limited, the therapeutic 
model remains adequate in preventing insurers from imposing genetic testing on insurance 
candidate. 
 
Legislative prohibition 
Another solution found among the European countries of civil law traditionxxi is the 
insertion of a provision simply prohibiting insurers from asking questions relating to either 
genetic test results or other genetic information.  At first glance, this approach could offer 
adequate protection to genetic information obtained in the clinical or research contexts. 
However, in addition to being a relatively inflexible solution, likely to reinforce the 
tendency to genetic exceptionalism,xxii this model also demonstrates the difficulty of 
adequately defining what constitutes a genetic test or genetic information.xxiii The 
consequences of this problem are prohibitions which are too broad,xxiv  too restricted,xxv or 
have an uncertain reach.xxvi   
The legislative prohibition model is also problematic since it does not take into 
account the “antiselection” phenomenon.  While “antiselection” has not been proven in 
recent studies of consumer behaviors,xxvii the potential risk for “antiselection” remains. 
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Despite the difficulties it presents, a legislative intrusion in the private insurance market 
could be justified because the product of insurance is inextricably linked to the acquisition 
of social goods (i.e houses, cars, loans etc.) in modern society. xxviii
System of regulatory review of the use of genetic tests 
After a two year study of an unprecented scope on the protection of genetic 
information in Australia, the Australian Law Reform Commission concluded that the 
Australian public doubted the capacities of insurers to interprete and use genetic 
information in a scientific manner for the underwriting process. Consequently, the 
Commission recommended that the Human Genetics Commission of Australia (HGSA) 
exert an independent control on the use of predictive genetic tests for insurance. Thus, if 
implemented, the HGSA will have to rule on the scientific reliability and the actuarial 
relevance of predictive genetic tests. This new system, inspired by recent British 
developments,xxix avoids the worst abuses, while leaving a considerable margin to the 
insurers who would like to use certain genetic tests in the underwriting process. However, 
because this system does not prevent genetic discrimination supported by actuarial data, is 
it sufficient to alleviate the public’s anxiety concerning genetic progress? 
A more interventionist approach is to empower a governmental regulatory body to 
determine more than just the actuarial reliability of the use of a test. A regulatory review 
structure exists already for medical devices and drugs. The same should exist for genetic 
testing, although the review system should do more than simply determining the validity of 
a new test. A regulatory agency should also review the potential social impact of allowing 
the use of certain forms of genetic testing and should determine its value, as well as the 
context in which these tests could be used. Under this system of review, the approval of a 
genetic test should include details about who can conduct an approved test and for what 
purposes. This is what a recent Ontario report also recommends.xxx
 
Moratorium 
A particularly popular approach, often used in countries of the common law 
tradition, is the adoption of a voluntary moratorium by insurers. A moratorium can be 
defined as a voluntary agreement by a group of insurers (often through an official 
representative organization), neither to request genetic testing of insurance applicantsxxxi 
nor to use genetic test results.xxxii Moratoria are often adopted by insurers as a response to 
public or even governmental pressure.xxxiii  
The major interest of a moratorium is its flexibility and its ease of implementation. 
Insurers are free to limit their engagement (i.e. temporal limits, financial limits, definitional 
limits, etc.) in the way which they feel to be most suitable. The majority of moratoria are 
limited in time, the insurers giving themselves a certain period to evaluate the actuarial 
relevance of genetic tests. Moratoria can be particularly useful as a temporary measure to 
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reassure the public and to exercise pressure on competitors within the industry to accept a 
common standard.   
Although not avoiding the definitional problems associated with certain approaches 
discussed previously, the flexibility of a moratorium makes it a particularly attractive 
system to deal with an issue (on a temporary basis) which is affected by technological 
developments and where governments or regulators are in doubt about the appropriate 
regulatory structure.  
One of the significant limitations of this approach is that it relies on the goodwill of 
those signing on to the moratorium. Professional associations that establish a moratorium 
may have moral persuasion over their members but they do not have real power over those 
in the industry who do not feel not bound by its rules.xxxiv This hurdle can be avoided by 
involving the government in the process in order to ensure the respect of a moratorium and 
thus increase its credibility.xxxv
 
Proportional Approach 
The proportional approach is generally used in conjunction with a moratorium or a 
legislative prohibition.xxxvi This approach allows insurance applicants to abstain from 
revealing their genetic test results when the cost for a desired policy is below a certain 
established amount. At times, this approach is extended to cover other types of information 
usually required by the insurers. The proportional approach guarantees the applicant access 
to a minimum amount of life insurance without having to reveal any health information.  
Unfortunately, this latest type of insurance product either provides coverage for a very low 
amount, or is very expensive. Due to cost, this form of insurance is unpopular among 
people who do not present a particularly high risk. 
 An interesting (and perhaps more equitable) variation of the proportional approach, 
consists of allowing questions about genetic tests result only when the amount of life 
insurance subscribed exceeds the annual income of the insurance candidate. 
 
Status Quo 
The limited number of genetic tests that are both available on the market and useful 
for insurersxxxvii, together with the paucity of legally reported cases of arbitrary genetic 
discriminationxxxviii, have  persuaded certain governmentsxxxix to wait before taking any 
specific measures to prohibit access by insurers to genetic information.  According to 
supporters of the “status quo”, the protection granted to the population through human 
rights and privacy laws are enough to provide an adequate safeguard against unwarranted 
discrimination. Furthermore, the competitive forces of the market will constitute additional 
protection against possible abuses by insurers. xl
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Nothwithstanding the fact that existing legal mechanisms often provide some 
protection, the decision to maintain the “status quo” does not take into consideration public 
perception as well as its impact on human genetic research. Studies have shown that the 
public’s fear for “genetic discrimination” by insurers lies behind reluctance to participate in 
research or a decision to withdraw.xli Such fear could also prevent some from undergoing 
genetic tests for health care purposes.xlii   
The “status quo” also does not provide satisfactory answers to the wider debate on 
whether there should be limits to the right of insurers to use information on family history. 
The value of providing some form of guaranteed insurance to the population at large is also 
incompatible with this approach.  
 
Conclusion 
Because the private life insurance market requires the classification of applicants 
within different risk levels, it necessarily involves a degree of discriminationxliii. Very few 
genetic tests offer sufficient reliability to be of use to insurers. Even in the few cases where 
genetic tests could currently be considered reliable enough to be of interest to insurers, their 
use for insurance underwriting remains controversial.xliv A growing number of 
industrialized countries have become conscious of the importance of having access to a 
minimum level of life insurance. The interest of insurers in knowing genetic test results is 
therefore perceived by many as a threat to a social or quasi-social good.  
Several countries have attempted to restrict access by insurers to genetic 
information. Conversely, others have taken a wait-and-see approach, hoping that 
traditionnal human rights legal instruments along with the competitive forces of the market 
would be sufficient to prevent an unwarranted use of genetic information.   
It is important to understand not only the uncertainty associated with genetic data, 
but also the socio-political and economical strengths of insurers and the potential social 
implications of the use of genetic information. The adoption of a voluntary moratorium by 
associations of insurers has the advantage of providing a high level of flexibility while 
reassuring the population. At a minimum, the publication of a Code of Conduct by insurers 
would add transparency to the process and inform the population. A moratorium would 
create a space for further debate about the appropriate regulatory and/or legislative 
interventions required to deal with the social implications of the use of genetic and other 
forms of health information outside of the health care context. In the case of incapacity to 
enforce the respect of a moratorium by insurers, legislative intervention might prove 
necessary. Any intervention in this area however, should be accompanied by a wider public 
debate about the social role of life insurance and about the importance and limitations of 
the current underwriting proccess.  
 
 7
Restrictions to the Use of Genetic Information by Insurers for  
Life Insurance  Underwriting* 
*This table is an updated version of the original table from B. M. KNOPPERS, B. 
GODARD, Y. JOLY, “Life Insurance and Genetics: A Comparative International 
Overview” in ROTHSTEIN M. (ed.) Life Insurance: Medical Underwriting and Social 
Policy, Cumberland, MIT Press (in press). 
 
 MORATORIUM   LEGISLATION GUIDELINES OTHER DRAFT 
 
AUSTRIA No Yes No       
AUSTRALIA Partial Exp : 2005  No Yes 
A bill on genetic 
privacy was 
introduced in 1998 
but has not yet 
been accepted.  
A joint inquiry on the 
protection of genetic 
information has 
recently been 
conducted  by the 
Australian Law 
Reform 
Commission.  
BELGIUM No Yes No       
BULGARIA No No No 
Ratified the 
Oviedo convention 
01/08/03.  
A constitutional 
amendment 
prohibiting genetic 
discrimination has 
been introduced in 
the National 
Assembly (summer 
2002).  
CANADA Partial No Yes       
CHILE No No Yes       
CYPRUS No No No 
Ratified the 
Oviedo convention 
01/07/02.  
   
CZECH REPUBLIC No No No 
Ratified the 
Oviedo convention 
01/10/01.  
   
CROATIA No No No 
Ratified the 
Oviedo convention 
28/11/03.  
   
DENMARK No Yes Yes 
Ratified the 
Oviedo convention 
01/12/99.  
   
ESTONIA No Yes No 
Ratified the 
Oviedo convention 
01/06/02. 
   
 MORATORIUM   LEGISLATION GUIDELINES OTHER DRAFT 
FINLAND 
Yes 
Unlimited amount 
Exp: none 
No Yes       
FRANCE 
Yes  
Unlimited amount 
Exp: 2004 
Yes Yes       
A parliamentary 
commission  has 
declared that 
insurers  should not 
use genetic test 
results. 
GERMANY 
Yes  
Limited  
amount 
Exp: 2006 
No Yes    
GEORGIA No Yes No 
Ratified the 
Oviedo convention 
01/03/01. 
   
GREECE Partial No Yes 
Ratified the 
Oviedo convention 
01/12/99. 
   
HUNGARY No No Yes 
Ratified the 
Oviedo convention 
01/05/02. 
   
ICELAND No No No 
A bill has been 
presented but has 
not been enacted. 
   
INDIA No No Yes       
IRELAND 
Yes 
Limited amount 
Some conditions 
are excluded 
Exp:2005 
No No       
ISRAËL No Yes No       
ITALY No No Yes    
Guidelines for 
genetic testing to be 
adopted shortly by 
the ministry of 
health. 
 9
 MORATORIUM   LEGISLATION GUIDELINES OTHER DRAFT 
JAPAN No No Yes    
The Association of 
Life insurance 
Medicine of Japan 
has a code of 
practice in 
preparation. 
Ministry of health to 
issue guidelines. 
Insurers are not 
allowed to ask for 
family history 
information.  
LITHUANIA No No No 
Ratified the 
Oviedo convention 
17/10/02. 
   
LUXEMBOURG No Yes Yes       
MOLDOVA No No No 
Ratified the 
Oviedo convention 
26/11/02. 
   
NETHERLAND No Yes Yes       
NEW ZEALAND Partial No Yes       
NORWAY No Yes Yes       
PORTUGAL No No Yes 
Ratified the 
Oviedo convention 
13/08/01. 
Article 13 of the 
Portuguese 
Constitution could 
prevent insurers to 
discriminate on the 
basis of genetic 
test results.  
A task force 
established by the 
ministry of health 
has prepared key 
guidelines 
addressing genetic 
testing.  
ROMANIA No No No 
Ratified the 
Oviedo convention 
01/08/01  
   
SAN MARINO No No No 
Ratified the 
Oviedo convention 
01/12/99.  
   
SINGAPORE No No Yes       
SLOVAKIA No Yes No 
Ratified the 
Oviedo convention 
01/12/99. 
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 MORATORIUM   LEGISLATION GUIDELINES OTHER DRAFT 
A Bill is expected to 
be drawn up in the 
near future 
addressing human 
genetics.  
SLOVENIA No No No 
Ratified the 
Oviedo convention 
01/12/99.  
Insurers are not 
allowed to ask for 
family history 
information. 
SOUTH AFRICA Partial No Yes    
A Bill prohibiting 
discrimination in 
insurance and 
employment has 
passed through the 
national assembly, 
presidential sanction 
is planned for 
February 2005. 
SOUTH KOREA No No No    
SPAIN No No No 
Ratified the 
Oviedo convention 
01/01/00. 
The Spanish 
constitution could 
prevent insurers to 
discriminate on the 
basis of genetic 
test results.  
Under current law 
insurers do not have 
an ex lege right 
entitling them to 
gather genetic 
information 
concerning a 
potential applicant.  
SWEDEN 
Yes 
Limited amount 
Exp: Dec 2004 
Yes Yes       
SWITZERLAND Yes Yes Yes       
Insurers are not 
allowed to ask for 
family history 
information.  
TAIWAN No No No    
TURKEY Yes(1) No No       
UNITED KINGDOM 
Yes 
Limited amount 
Some conditions 
are excluded 
Exp: 2006 
No Yes       
Several bills 
addressing genetics 
and insurance have 
been drafted, but 
none enacted.  
UNITED STATES 
(federal 
government) 
No No No    
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Moratorium  
(also includes voluntary agreements between governments and insurers) 
Partial: Insurers will not ask applicants to undergo genetic testing but may request 
the results of genetic tests already taken. 
Limited amount: Insurers will not ask applicants to undergo genetic testing or 
request the results of genetic tests already taken unless the insurance policies 
asked for are over a given amount. 
Unlimited amount: Insurers will never ask applicants to undergo genetic testing or 
request the results of past genetic tests.  
Legislation
Covers genetic specific legislation, prohibiting genetic testing at large, or insurers 
access to genetic tests. 
Guidelines
Covers any guidelines made by scientific or professional organizations on the 
subject of genetics and insurance. 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
States that have ratified this Convention are bound by it. The Convention forbids 
any kind of discrimination against a person based on genetic heritage. Genetic 
testing should only be permitted for health or research purposes.  
(1) Additional informations on the moratorium were unavailable. 
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